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OPINION*   
__________ 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Anita Holley appeals the denial of her claim for disability benefits.  She argues 
that the District Court ignored our precedent and wrongly upheld the ALJ’s decision.  We 
will affirm.   
 This opinion does not have any precedential value.  Therefore, our discussion of 
the case is limited to covering only what is necessary to explain our decision to the 
parties. 
 Holley challenges the denial of her claim, arguing that the ALJ did not properly 
consider all of her impairments.  According to Holley, the ALJ’s residual functional 
capacity ruling—that she is able to perform sedentary, unskilled labor requiring no more 
than thirty days of training—was a mistake because:  it did not properly consider the 
ALJ’s own finding that Holley had moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, 
persistence or pace; and, it was based on a flawed finding that she could sit for six hours.  
She maintains that the District Court missed these errors, in part, because it failed to 
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apply the requirements of Ramirez v. Barnhart, 372 F.3d 546 (3d Cir. 2004).  We will 
consider each of these issues separately. 
 Holley has a problem with the way that the ALJ handled his finding of moderate 
difficulties in the areas of concentration, persistence and pace.  She says the hypothetical 
that the ALJ gave to the vocational expert was lacking because it described her as limited 
to work that is composed of tasks that can be learned in thirty days or less.  She is 
convinced that the ALJ was required to specifically tell the vocational expert, in the 
context of the hypothetical, that she had moderate difficulties in concentration, 
persistence and pace.  We disagree.   
 While Holley focused upon the ALJ’s broad finding of moderate difficulties at 
step two of the sequential evaluation, we give more attention to the substance of his 
overall review.  We want to know how well the ALJ studied the record, and how 
thoroughly he understood Holley’s specific impairments (or lack thereof) before making 
his decisions about her residual functional capacity, and ultimately, her disability claim.  
After reviewing everything, we conclude that the ALJ had a sound knowledge of the 
record.  His analysis of the evidence easily met our standards and expectations.   
 The ALJ noted that there was an unsupported comment by a treating physician 
(who was not a mental health professional) suggesting that she had an anxiety-related 
disability.  Additionally, the ALJ knew that Holley had a non-specific diagnosis of mood 
disorder and personality disorder.  But, he also was aware that Holley did not ask for or 
receive any psychiatric treatment and had not taken any psychotropic medications; and he 
noticed that—according to her own reports—she was able to complete activities of daily 
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living independently without any limitations from any mental condition.  The ALJ 
pointed to an examining physician’s statement that Holley only had a mild difficulty with 
delayed recall.   Otherwise, she completed structured tasks of short duration, she 
sustained concentration, and she remained alert, oriented and compliant throughout the 
examination.  This examining physician determined that Holley had no mental 
limitations, or only mild limitations, in her ability to do work-related activities.  From this 
record, the ALJ discounted the unsupported comment of the treating physician and relied 
on the opinion of the examining physician.  He appropriately judged that Holley’s clinical 
record showed that she had—at most—minor mental impairments.   
   In light of this, Holley’s insistence that the ALJ’s hypothetical should have 
included a specific statement about impairments on concentration, persistence and pace is 
not persuasive.  The evidence Holley produced on mental impairments was generally 
very thin, particularly on disabling limits in persistence or pace.  Therefore, she gives us 
no compelling reason why these should have been spelled out in detail in the 
hypothetical.  On this record, the ALJ’s residual functional capacity finding was accurate, 
comprehensive and supported by substantial evidence, and we are convinced that he gave 
the vocational expert enough information to provide a sound opinion about the types and 
numbers of jobs that were available.  The District Court did not make any mistakes in its 
review of the ALJ’s handling of the evidence on mental impairments.  
 Similarly, we rule that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Holley 
has the residual functional physical capacity to sit for up to six hours and perform 
sedentary work.  The ALJ noted that the physicians who commented on this topic had a 
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similar opinion of Holley’s physical limitations.  These were the basis for his decision 
that Holley could do sedentary work.  We are not persuaded by any of Holley’s attempts 
to undermine this reasonable conclusion.  The ALJ did not misinterpret or ignore the 
reports of any physician, nor did he put words in their mouths.  He did incorporate some 
observations about Holley’s conduct during administrative proceedings into his 
deliberation, but this is not a problem because he did not use them as the only basis for 
his decision.  Likewise, as the District Court concluded, the ALJ properly considered 
Holley’s full medical condition, including her weight, and he reasonably accounted for 
her prescribed medications.  Finally, the District Court was right:  the ALJ complied with 
the regulations and did a fine job explaining his credibility determinations on Holley’s 
statements about the severity of her impairments, and these findings are entitled to our 
deference.  The ALJ pointed out inconsistencies with Holley’s words and conduct, as 
well as contradictions between her reports and the record.  In the end, none of these 
arguments undermined the ALJ’s ruling about Holley’s ability to do sedentary work. 
 For all of these reasons, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 
decision to decline Holley’s claim for disability benefits, and we will affirm the order of 
the District Court.    
